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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Micro-Sociological Dynamics of Repression: How 
Interactions between Protesters and Security 
Forces Shaped the Bahraini Uprising
Isabel Bramsen
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Copenhagen, DK
ib@cric.ku.dk
The article applies a micro-sociological approach to investigate civil-military relations in a very 
concrete form: How do interactions between protesters and security forces shape the devel-
opment of a conflict? Based on fieldwork in Bahrain and interviews with activists, journalists 
and opposition politicians, the article analyses the micro-sociological dynamics of how, despite 
great numbers and momentum, the Arab Uprising in Bahrain was repressed without, however 
turning into a military insurgence as in Syria. The article argues that the Bahraini regime was 
able to repress and silence the February 14 uprising through; 1) non-intervention during the 
momentum of the uprising, 2) injuring, torturing, and imprisoning rather than killing protesters, 
and 3) employment of expats in the military and police. Zooming in on micro-sociological pro-
cesses provides not only a detailed narrative of the events, but also a recognition of dynamics 
that are often overlooked, notably how particular forms of repression make people gather in 
solidarity and outrage, energizing further counter-action, whereas other forms of repression 
involving torture, imprisonment, and injuring, but no visible, lethal violence can de-energize a 
protest movement.
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The uprising in Bahrain has been and continues to be overlooked in the Western media compared to the 
coverage of other Arab uprisings. This is not because the Bahraini people did not take to the streets in great 
numbers in 2011, as in for example Tunisia or Egypt. In fact, Bahrain was the country where the largest per-
centage of the population took part in the demonstrations. 
Despite or perhaps because of the lack of focus on Bahrain the Bahraini uprising remains a very interest-
ing example of an uprising that has been violently repressed by the regime without, as in Syria, turning into 
a military insurgence (yet). In this article, I will address the question of how the Bahraini regime has been 
able to repress the February 14 movement. I argue that the Bahraini regime repressed the uprising through:
1) Sectarian policies and non-intervention during the momentum of the uprising.
2) Injuring, torturing, and imprisoning rather than killing protesters.
3) Employment of expats in the military and police.
4) Western and Saudi support (material, silencing, and PR advice).
Although an important aspect, this article will not address the fourth component of repression, involving 
Western and Saudi support, as the main focus will be on the concrete relations and interactions between the 
Bahraini police and military, on the one hand, and the protesters, on the other. 
Rather than assessing the structural conditions for repression as such, I will analyze the micro-interactions 
of repression and dissent, what one could consider concrete civil-military relations. I will apply the theoreti-
cal lenses of micro-sociology to understand how interactions between the security forces and the protesters 
shaped the development of the Bahraini uprising (Collins 2004; Bramsen & Poder 2014, 2018). 
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Theory
The article applies American sociologist Randall Collins’ micro-sociological theory (Collins 2004). Grand 
theories have become unfashionable within the social sciences, but although Collins’ approach is micro-
analytical, it can indeed be characterized as a ‘grand theory’, in the sense that it claims to be able to analyze 
and understand every aspect of the social world, from the tobacco industry and scholarly competition to 
sexual interaction, social movements, violence, and restorative justice (Collins 2004, 2009; Rossner 2013). 
Existing schools of conflict research have different, relatively established assumptions about conflicts: that 
they are driven by rational calculation (Collier & Hoeffler 2004), grievances (Gurr 1970), traumas (Volkan 
2006), or discursive contestation (Demmers 2012). In many ways, Collins’ theory begins even before the 
issue of what drives actors, considering whether people have the energy to strive to do something in the 
first place and not what makes them do one thing or another (Collins 2004). It argues that individuals are 
energized by social rituals and that they strive to obtain such energy. The basic assumption is that emotional 
energy is a force of agency that individuals are charged with through so-called interaction rituals. An inter-
action ritual is a social gathering, like a funeral or demonstration, with bodily co-presence, a shared mood, 
barriers to outsiders, and a mutual focus of attention that generates group solidarity and emotional energy 
among the participants. If parties are humiliated, suppressed, and thus de-energized, they refrain from act-
ing and engaging in further conflict. If people are instead energized with either positive emotional energy, 
such as pride, togetherness, and confidence, or negative emotional energy (Boyns & Luery 2015), such as 
anger and outrage (or both), they are likely to engage in conflictual action. The notions of negative, positive, 
and loss of emotional energy relate to Pearlman’s (2013) conceptualization of dispiriting and emboldening 
emotions, but Collins’ micro-sociological framework adds an important dimension on how these emotions 
are generated in specific situations. Bramsen and Poder (2014, 2018) identify three central types of inter-
action rituals in conflicts: solidarity interaction rituals, where the participants are energized with positive 
emotional energy; domination rituals, where the dominating party is energized while the other is de-ener-
gized; and conflict interaction rituals, where both parties are energized with negative emotional energy. In 
this sense, mobilization is a highly emotional phenomenon, both because emotions drive the action and 
inaction of conflicting parties, and because the rituals involved in mobilization, such as demonstrations, 
energize actors to engage in further action if they are successful (Ibid.; Collins 2001; Jasper 2001; Pearlman 
2013). Collins’ micro-sociology takes a different analytical starting point than most theories, namely situa-
tions, arguing that all social phenomena are generated and occur in particular situations and interactions, 
and that research therefore should have situations as its unit of analysis. In contrast to quantitative studies, 
this micro-sociological approach can reveal some of the everyday mechanisms and social dynamics that 
shape mobilization, conflict escalation, and sectarian tension.
Method
The argument in this article is based on an analysis of video material of interactions between Bahraini mili-
tary and police and the protesters, on interviews with Bahraini activists, opposition politicians, and journal-
ists, and on participatory observation of a demonstration conducted on a fieldtrip to Bahrain in 2015. Due 
to censorship and systematic repression, Bahrain is a very difficult country to enter, let alone stay in. Before 
traveling to the country, I went to great lengths to erase all traces revealing that I had been doing research 
on Bahrain. I entered on a tourist visa on February 4, 2015 together with my partner, daughter, and parents-
in-law, appearing to be on a family holiday. This was 10 days before the anniversary of the Arab Spring in 
Bahrain. We were all deported on February 13, one day before the anniversary, when my farther-in-law took a 
picture of a roadblock from our rented car. I stayed in the capital, Manama, but visited different Shia villages 
where most protests have taken place, some of which are embedded in Manama. I participated in one pro-
test in the village of Bilal Alqadeem and conducted 11 semi-structured, tape-recorded interviews, including 
two group interviews and two Skype interviews in English. I had three contacts, who put me in touch with 
more informants before traveling to Bahrain. Nobody wanted to make appointments before I had entered 
the country. Bahrain is a small country, which makes it easy to get an impression of the opposition move-
ment and talk to the majority of the leading activists. The YouTube video1 material from Bahrain is very com-
prehensive and can give us a detailed impression of specific situations of violence with videos from the last 
four years of protesting. I collected the visual material online and through personal contacts among activists 
 1 The video datasets are available online. Videos of violence (V): http://violence.ogtal.dk/. Videos of nonviolence (NV): https://
violence.ogtal.dk/index2.php.
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and journalists.2 Given that the informants are activists, opposition politicians and journalists, and the vid-
eos are primarily recorded by activists, the analysis may appear biased. Not only because the interviews give 
voice to the opposition, and the perspective of the regime and its supporters is not equally represented, but 
also because my own standpoint as a researcher is not unaffected by listening to numerous stories of how 
informants have been tortured and humiliated. Moreover, I have a bias that activists have a right to protest 
and to ask for democratic changes in their country. This bias does not result in less rigorous research, but 
it requires being explicit about the normative standpoints that always, albeit to different degrees, shape 
research. Just as the parties to a conflict, including third parties, cannot be neutral, research about conflict 
and violence cannot renounce normativity (Bramsen, Nielsen & Vindeløv 2016).
Historical Background 
Bahrain has been ruled by the Al Khalifa royal family since 1783. It was a British protectorate until 1971 and 
continues to enjoy close ties with Britain. Bahrain is also a close ally of Saudi Arabia and the U.S., hosting 
the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The Al Khalifa family is Sunni, like 30% of the population, whereas 70% are Shia. The 
Bahraini military and police only recruit Sunni Muslims and go so far as to invite Sunnis from Pakistan, Syria, 
and Yemen. Accordingly, the Bahraini military is composed of Sunnis of Bahraini origin and other nationali-
ties, and most military personnel have good reason – financial as well as identity-related – to remain loyal 
(Albrecht & Ohl 2016). The Arab Spring revolution in Bahrain has roots in a decades-old struggle for political 
rights and equality, most recently with social unrest in the 1990s, where the Shia community in the country 
petitioned and demonstrated for reform, often supported by the Sunni community (Karolak 2012). With the 
death of H.H. Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 1999, H.H. Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa became emir of 
the state of Bahrain. This gave rise to an era of hope, with optimism that the grievances that caused unrest 
in the 1990s would be addressed. H.M. King Hamad freed political prisoners and initiated a framework for 
reform, the National Action Charter, which was supported by 98.4% of the votes in a referendum where 
women had the right to vote. In 2002 Hamad declared Bahrain a kingdom, appointing himself king. The 
optimism soon shifted, as the reforms were seen to be merely cosmetic: The king and the upper house of 
the parliament (the members of which are selected by the king) must approve the bills put forward by the 
elected lower house before implementation. The 2002 elections were therefore boycotted by the Shia politi-
cal societies. The biggest opposition party, Al-Wefaq, decided to take part in the 2006 elections. Although 
Al-Wefaq became the largest party in parliament, with 17 of the 40 seats, this was not translated into actual 
influence: 25 of the 27 bills presented by the lower house in 2007 were rejected by the upper house. The 
lack of concrete change and influence following the Al-Wefaq parliamentary experiment caused splinter 
groups to boycott the political system and tension to rise ahead of the 2010 elections (Karolak 2012).
The Bahraini Uprising
The successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired Bahraini activists and provided them with new energy 
and tactics for how to occupy central squares and topple the regime. The first calls to demonstrations mobi-
lized around 6,000 people, but the protests grew in number, and determination increased with the killing 
of demonstrators (Bassiouni et al. 2011). The funerals gave room for mourning, grief, and the generation of 
unity in the movement. One protester describes how “attending his funeral had led back an anger among the 
people, we went to the graveyard, it was the first and angriest protest of my life” (personal communication, 
February 2015). The killings of protesters “inflame[d] the passions of fellow demonstrators and expand[ed] 
the number of participants in the movement” (Fattahi 2012). On February 16 the death of a protester drove 
thousands into the streets in Manama. Inspired by the occupation of the Tharir Square in Egypt, the Bahraini 
protesters occupied the Pearl Roundabout. One activist described how “[e]veryone was happy, optimistic, 
believing that we were very close to get our aspiration, our freedom, dignity and so on. So, we felt in that 
place, very proud of ourselves” (personal communication, February 2015).
Momentum and Movement Solidarity
The protest movement initially established great momentum with increased public solidarity and coher-
ence and limited or no references to sectarian divisions. People waved banners declaring unity between 
Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country, and activists posted Facebook pictures of being neither Sunni nor 
 2 The Bahraini riot police also record many of the demonstrations. It would have been extremely useful to have access to this mate-
rial and thus see the demonstrations from their perspective. I therefore asked a colleague to email them to me, but I never got a 
response.
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Shia but ‘Sushi’. Several Sunni Muslims also supported the uprising, and many experienced the time at the 
Pearl Roundabout as an anti-sectarian gathering of co-existence (Aldairy 2013). During this momentum the 
regime attempted to crack down on the uprising at 3:00 am the night between February 16 and 17. While 
people were asleep, the riot police, equipped with sticks, sound bombs, teargas, and shotguns, removed the 
demonstrators from the Pearl Roundabout, killing four. The following day funerals for the dead attracted 
thousands of participants. According to an Al-Jazeera documentary, the funerals were very intense and “the 
intensity of grief and determination made relatives faint” (Al-Jazeera 2011). The funeral turned into a protest 
march that started returning to the Pearl Roundabout, chanting “salmya salmya” (peaceful, peaceful). When 
the protesters were around 200 meters from the security forces protecting the area, they were shot at with 
live ammunition. One was killed and several injured (Video 16V).
The momentum of the uprising rendered it very difficult for the government in Bahrain to sustain the 
crackdown against the protesters. One activist reflected on how “the government was panicking: ‘How can 
we stop these angry people? If we repress them more, it will lead to violence and it will speed up [the 
transition].’ You know, the consequences would be very big” (personal communication, February 2015). A 
spokesperson from Al-Wefaq explains his role in convincing the regime to remove the troops from the Pearl 
Roundabout: 
Then he [the king] offered the dialogue and we went into negotiations. I met with him and said, 
“Okay, pull out the army and the people will go to the Pearl Roundabout. Either you open it for 
them or you can stay here and then you deal with them and convince them to move, and then the 
youth will claim a victory by returning to the roundabout, and when they claim the victory, it will 
seem as though you cannot control their presence.” (personal communication, February 2015)
As if he had listened to this advice, the crown prince went on air grieving the deaths, and the regime with-
drew the army from the Pearl Roundabout, now only guarded by riot police and surrounded by barbed 
wire. The following day protesters approached the Pearl Roundabout with peaceful chants and roses. The 
intense pressure from demonstrators dominating the situation in loudness and numbers caused the police 
to retreat (Bramsen 2018). In the words of another participant, “unarmed peaceful protesters had opened 
the Pearl Roundabout without anything but determination” (personal communication, February 2015). The 
Pearl Roundabout was characterized by a festival-like atmosphere of euphoria and joy (personal communica-
tion, February 2015). The solidarity among the participants was high, with people preparing food for each 
other, chanting, and artists singing and performing. Activists used the national flag to unite people as a 
nation, and slogans of sectarian unity prevailed: 
We were repeating day by day that Sunni and Shia are brothers. This country is not for sale, this land 
is for us and for you […] we were crying to them: “Don’t believe the regime! The regime wants us to 
be enemies.” (personal communication, February 2015)
The Bahraini regime did several things to sectarianize the uprising. It portrayed the revolutionary move-
ment as exclusively Shia, supported or possibly even directed by Iran. It mobilized Sunni Islamists to stage 
public support for the regime in demonstrations (Fattahi 2012). One concrete attempt at sectarianizing the 
conflict in Bahrain occurred when the government suggested dialogue with the demonstrators. Rather than 
dialogue between the regime and the activists, they wanted the king to sit at the end of the table and rep-
resentatives of the two sects to discuss the opposition’s claims. The activists refused to engage in these talks 
for the reason that doing so would turn the conflict into a sectarian conflict between two sects rather than 
a political conflict between the state and the people (Andersen 2011).
Movement Fractionalization
As time passed and the protesters were allowed to remain at the Pearl Roundabout, however, the unity of 
the protesters began to crumble (Bramsen 2018). Without more killings of protesters, the regime’s lethal 
repression no longer kept the movement together in solidarity, and a split developed between the reformists 
and the revolutionaries: those demanding the overthrow of the regime and those who aspired for reform. 
An activist describes how:
Within the opposition, you started to have the people who supported the political societies who 
said dialogue is the way to go and all you need to do is to create situations that can be used as a 
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bargaining chip in the dialogue. And you had those who disagreed with them. And you had those 
who said, “No we need to start escalating, we need to build pressure.” They were seen as being radi-
cals. (personal communication, November 2014)
The internal lines of division in the movement concerned not only the goal of the movement, regime change, 
or reform, but also what types of action should be taken to reach this goal. On several occasions, the Febru-
ary 14 movement arranged demonstrations which the political societies had advised against. An opposition 
politician from Al-Wefaq argued that:
Such escalation, demands to overthrow the regime, and the call for a republic – the demonstration 
near the palace and the blockage of the financial harbor, this won’t be tolerated. And this will cause 
us to lose part of the Sunnis who supported the movement, more assuredness from the GCC3 to 
intervene and not support from the international community. (personal communication, February 
2015)
Whereas the revolutionaries, inspired by the momentum of the Arab Spring, had high hopes that they could 
replicate the regime change in Egypt and Tunisia, Al-Wefaq had a different view on the prospects for and 
pace of change: “We know the severity of the situation in Bahrain: the demography, the Sunni/Shia issue, 
the regional context with the Saudi, the other GCC regimes” (personal communication, February 2015). 
According to Fattahi:
The ambiguity surrounding the precise political ends of the demonstration movement alarmed the 
ruling Sunni minority, including its moderate bloc, who feared for their life, property, and power if 
Shiites were to abolish the Sunni monarchy and establish a Shiite-dominated republic. (2012)
Matthiesen (2013) has documented how the internal lines of division in the movement became visible 
between radical Shia groups, like Shiriza, supporters of Hezbollah, youth groups like the February 14 coali-
tion, and the more radical coalition for a republic. Moreover, the Sunni supporters of the movement largely 
drifted away. Matthiesen describes his meeting with a politically active Sunni woman who had initially 
joined the demonstrations at the Pearl Roundabout, but later joined pro-government Sunni groups, partly 
due to her dissatisfaction with the Shia angle that some slogans had taken (Matthiesen 2013: 68).
Moreover, incidents in villages and schools outside Manama, away from the anti-sectarian atmosphere at 
the Pearl Roundabout, increased sectarian tensions, thereby contributing to the displacement of the lines of 
conflict of a nation against a dictatorship to one of two competing sects. The first major sectarian incident 
occurred on March 3 in Hama Town, an area with a mixed Sunni-Shia population. According to the Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report (Bassiouni et al. 2011), fighting broke out between Shia 
students who had participated in a protest earlier that day and a group of naturalized Sunni teenagers, and 
it escalated to a street battle with knives, sticks, and metal rods. To counter the increasing sectarian tension 
and increase national unity, activists organized a human chain between the Al-Fateh Mosque in Juffair and 
the Pearl Roundabout on 4 March; however, incidents with sectarian connotations continued to occur.
Tension and a sense of insecurity were on the rise. A researcher witnessing the events described how:
From March 7 more and more helicopters were deployed and not only during the demonstra-
tions – they hang in the air throughout the night. […] The last night I was there [12–13 March], the 
atmosphere was really uncomfortable: constant helicopters, and everywhere in the city demonstra-
tors drove in cars and used the horn to the slogan, honk, honk, honk-honk [the rhythm of the slogan 
down, down Hamad]. (Andersen, email correspondence)4
According to the BICI report, a “turning point” occurred on March 13 (Bassiouni et al. 2011: 126), when 
several events “caused a wave of fear” (Bassiouni et al. 2011: 126), and increased tension among the Bahraini 
citizens played out. Notably, a disputed incident at the University of Bahrain on 13 March left many injured. 
There are conflicting accounts of what happened – whether pro-government students began to attack and 
harass anti-government student demonstrations, or whether armed individuals, not students, were led onto 
 3 Gulf Cooperation Council.
 4 Email correspondence with Senior Researcher Lars Erslev Andersen, translated by the author.
Bramsen: Micro-Sociological Dynamics of Repression14
the campus and attacked demonstrators. Several activists from the Pearl Roundabout reportedly drove to 
the University of Bahrain after hearing about the events and joined the anti-government students (Al-Jazeera 
2011; Bassiouni et al. 2011).
Already on March 7 activists had decided to escalate the conflict further and expand the demonstration 
from the Pearl Roundabout to the financial district. One activist describes how:
People started going out from the Pearl Square to the financial harbor. That’s what people thought 
was necessary for escalation in 2011. We’re here in the Pearl Square, the government is so far quiet 
about it. We need to escalate. We need to get things to move. (personal communication, November 
2014)
On March 13 this escalation culminated in a blockade of the entrance to the financial district and fights 
between protesters and the police. One video shows riot police attacking protesters on a hill between a 
highway and the Pearl Roundabout (Video 40). Other videos show protesters chasing outnumbered police 
officers who retreat to their cars (Video 41). A Canadian English teacher who could watch and film the events 
at the Pearl Roundabout from his balcony describes how:
I watched the events unfolding from my windows and from the car park (until teargas intervened) 
and eventually the police retreated, much to the delight of the protesters. The battle had lasted for 
most of the morning and only ended when the police knew that they did not have the numbers. 
(Mitchell 2016)
The Crackdown
On March 14 the Bahraini government called for reinforcements from the Saudi army, which entered with 
tanks the same day. Martial law was declared the night between March 15 and 16, and the Pearl Roundabout 
and other protest sights were cleared. The regime did not need much manpower to disperse the protesters 
this time, as the Pearl Roundabout “was far less crowded Wednesday morning than it had been in recent 
days, as many protesters had returned to their villages to protect their homes. Those who remained did not 
put up a stiff fight” (Birnbaum 2011). The Pearl Statue and Roundabout that had turned into symbols of the 
movement were demolished, and a highway that remains closed at the time of writing was established in 
its place.
What can account for the success of the crackdown on March 15, when the one on February 17 failed? 
Many observers ascribe the success of the second crackdown on Bahraini protesters to the loyalty of the 
army, comparing it to the civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt (e.g. Nepstad 2011, 2013). However, 
the loyalty of the army was constant throughout the revolution, defections never occurring. According to 
Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds (2015), the assistance from the Saudi army cannot explain the successful 
crackdown, as it did not take part in the repression of protesters, and the Bahraini forces never lacked the 
coercive capacity to repress the movement. However, although the official line is that the Saudi forces did 
not intervene directly, there are indications that they “free(d) up Bahraini’s own military and security forces 
to partake in a binge of repression” (Gelvin 2012: 138) or even took part in the crackdown (personal com-
munication, February 2015).5
Moreover, as I have described, fear and tension increased in the population during the week leading up 
to the crackdown. The unity, solidarity, and momentum of the movement peaked immediately after the 
Pearl Roundabout had been reoccupied in mid-March. Hereafter, when the regime allowed the protesters 
to occupy the Pearl Roundabout without further killings, the internal divisions grew. A lot of people still 
demonstrated at the Pearl Roundabout (enough to disturb traffic and force back security forces on March 
13), but the movement coherence was decreasing (Figure 1).
The days leading up to the crackdown are tricky. On the one hand, the protesters were forceful enough to 
push back the police. On the other hand, the movement was increasingly divided, with sectarian tensions 
rising in society in general and, perhaps more importantly, divisions between revolutionists and reformists. 
Some of the protesters escalated the situation by blocking the financial district and marching to the royal 
palace, but the big demonstrations with up to 100,000 participants did not take place in locations that could 
meaningfully challenge the regime. Hence, the regime was threatened and forced to either “engage in real 
dialogue with the protesters, or to forcibly remove them” (Andersen 2011). At the same time, however, it was 
 5 http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/bahrain-uprisinginterventionsaudiarabiaemirates.html.
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a disunited opposition standing on their doorstep that did not count the biggest opposition party, Al-Wefaq, 
and its many followers – and with waning Sunni participation. Thus, the uprising was more easily repressed. 
After the Crackdown
The Bahraini revolution was not completely silenced in 2011. When the curfew ended in the summer of 
2011, protesters again took to the streets in great numbers at marches organized by Al-Wefaq. These marches 
were banned in 2014, however, and the leader of Al-Wefaq was imprisoned. Although periods with sporadic, 
small, and (in certain periods) daily demonstrations have occurred since then, the revolution is significantly 
weakened.
Since the crackdown in March 2011 the Bahraini regime has systematically succeeded in demobilizing 
the movement through de-energizing repression. First, the humiliating practice of taking away national 
passports, imprisoning, torturing, and firing many of the people who participated in the protests severely 
de-energized the movement. The situation for the Shia community has worsened considerably since 2011, 
many people losing their jobs, and protesters, opposition politicians, and revolutionaries being imprisoned 
(personal communication, August 2014 and February and March 2015). An active member of the political 
party Wa’ad (National Democratic Action Society) described this ‘de-energization’:
In four years, I’ve aged maybe 40 years instead of only four. Because every day you’re facing an issue, 
how you’re going to build your life because you’re not allowed to work. You’re not allowed to do 
anything. If they catch you at a checkpoint, you’ll be humiliated. If they say that they will arrest you, 
they’ll come to your house. (personal communication, February 2015)
This type of repression corresponds to more indirect forms of repression: “civil liberties restrictions” 
(Davenport 2007) or “channeling strategies” (Earl 2003). Second, the regime has generally refrained from 
killing protesters since 2011, instead generally opting for torturing, injuring, and humiliating them. An 
activist described how the riot police “shoot people where you try not to kill them – injure them as much as 
you can, but not kill them,” (personal communication, August 2014) and an opposition politician likewise 
described how:
We don’t have martyrs like we had before; every week, every week, every week people were on the 
streets and processions like that. But now they have told them, and I think they have new instruc-
tions to like do damage but not to kill. So they shoot you in the face, you can lose an eye. (personal 
communication, February 2015)
This amounts to what Davenport (2007) refers to as “personal integrity violations”, just like killings in the 
streets. Based on my observations from Bahrain and Syria, however, I would argue that killings in the streets 
versus injuring and torturing have a different impact on mobilization, although both are considered personal 
integrity violations. The former angers people, generating moral outrage, bringing people together at funer-
als and thus energizing them for further protest action. On the other hand, torturing and injuring, although 
equally forceful, are more likely to de-energize individuals in fear and despair, thereby leading to inaction. 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Bahraini uprising, February/March 2011.
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This dynamic requires that researchers draw more fine-grained distinctions between types of repression. 
From an activist perspective, the mobilizing effects of repression are known as ‘backfiring’, because they 
have the opposite effect as intended by the regime. Brian Martin has argued that whether repression back-
fires or not depends on the visibility and degree to which an action is perceived as unjust/disproportion-
ate (Martin 2007). Obviously, it matters that killing in public is more visible than torturing in prisons, but 
I would argue that there is more to it. First, much of the torture in prisons has also been documented, 
although often with a delay. The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights has detailed visual and interview docu-
mentation of torture in Bahraini prisons, as does the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry. But 
there is a difference between knowing about a given atrocity, which emotions it may evoke, and how these 
emotions are channeled into mobilization (or not). Pictures and/or descriptions of torture may disgust and 
discourage the observer, whereas watching killings of demonstrators live or gathering for a funeral seems to 
enrage and energize spectators and participants. Mobilization is a social process that requires that people 
not only know about injustice, but are also sufficiently energized to act upon their indignation. If an activist 
is killed, people gather at funerals that can potentially turn into protest marches and strengthen the move-
ment. If people are imprisoned, tortured, or injured, this seems to scare away other protesters rather than 
mobilize them in anger and grief.
The de-energization in Bahrain was also visible in the demonstration in which I participated in 2015 in 
the village Bilal al-Qadeem. It followed the same route as most of the daily (often two daily) demonstrations 
in the village, and it was clear that demonstrations were very routinized; everyone knew when we would 
meet the riot police. In this demonstration and in the videos from this period the rhythm of chanting and 
marching is much slower than in videos from the beginning of the uprising (Videos 1-10NV), which indi-
cates intensity. 
The Composition of the Military as a Challenge for Nonviolent Resistance
Several researchers have rightly argued that the composition of the Bahraini military and police can account 
for the lack of defections in the Bahraini military vis-à-vis other places like Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria (Nepstad 
2011, 2013; Albrecht and Ohl 2016). Here I will address how the Sunni composition of the Bahraini security 
affects the relations to the protesters. I argue that the expats in the security forces pose a great challenge to 
the protesters, as they often cannot understand each other’s languages and cultural norms. Ketchley (2014) 
has described how tactics of fraternization were part of what generated the bond between protesters and 
Egypt’s army. Such tactics are challenged in Bahrain due to cultural and linguistic barriers. One protester, 
for example, explained that “one of the problems in Bahrain is communication, how can you communicate 
with the police force if they only speak Urdu? You don’t even speak a common language, so when you are 
standing there, screaming, Salmya Salmya (Peaceful Peaceful) the police officers have no idea what you are 
saying, all they see is screaming protesters” (personal communication, August 2014). She described a situa-
tion where her sister and her father faced the riot police: 
They are standing there and there are tanks on the road, and they are telling everyone to go home, 
and so my farther starts speaking to him because he was Bahraini, the guy in the tank was Bahraini 
which doesn’t happen often at all, right? and my dad stats speaking to him saying: you’re Bahraini 
and I’m Bahraini, you have kids and I have kids. And we share the same country, the same bread, we 
walk on the same soil, how can you shoot me? (personal communication, August 2014). 
The activist father and daughter told them that they would not move and then suddenly police forces with 
non-Arab background showed up and attacked them. The protesters thus found that it is more difficult 
for activists to use common nonviolent tactics of appealing to common interests and culture with the riot 
police when they are expats. 
Whereas the employment of foreign personnel in the police and military forces in Bahrain certainly 
remains a challenge for activists, it can be considered one of the reasons why the Bahraini uprising has not 
spiraled into a civil war, because the Bahraini security forces are seen as representing the government and, 
to a much lesser extent, the Sunni community. Whereas in, for example, Syria the soldiers and in particular 
the Shabiha are seen as representing not only the regime, but also to some extent the Alawite community, 
the protesters that I talked to were very aware of the security forces representing the regime, not the Sunni 
community. A recurrent impression among the activists and opposition politicians whom I talked to was 
that the Bahraini security forces are clearly following the orders of the regime (and my own experience 
with being deported confirms this). Also, Bahraini police and military are considered stupid, but not evil. A 
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telling joke among activists is that the military and police are recruited by asking the group of applicants to 
go to the left if they can read and write and to go to the right if they cannot. Those who remain and cannot 
understand the question get the job. 
Conclusion
This article has addressed how the Bahraini regime repressed the February 14 uprising through 1) non-
intervention during the momentum of the uprising, 2) injuring, torturing, and imprisoning rather than 
killing protesters, and 3) employment of expats in the military and police. Initially the killings of protest-
ers in 2011 enraged and engaged more people and thus gave rise to mobilization. Quickly, however, the 
Bahraini government changed its tactics and allowed the occupation of the Pearl Roundabout, while at 
the same time engaging in subtler forms of repression and challenging the unity of the movement. This 
did not initially hinder great demonstrations; in fact, the percentage of the population in Bahrain partici-
pating in demonstrations was greater than in any other Arab country. However, with no external conflict 
energizing and uniting the movement and with government strategies attempting to displace the conflict 
lines – from a conflict between the regime and its people to one between two sects – sectarian tensions 
and related tensions over the comprehensiveness of the demands grew. Parts of the movement organ-
ized more escalatory demonstrations, blocking the financial district and marching to the royal palace, 
whereas the biggest opposition party, Al-Wefaq, advised against such escalatory actions and organized its 
own events. In mid-March 2011, where fears in society and division had increased, parts of the movement 
escalated to the financial harbor, physically forcing back the riot police – that is, escalation at a time of 
low movement unity. The regime again attacked the Pearl Roundabout, this time with the help of Saudi 
Arabia, which, although no reports confirm its direct intervention, further increased the psychological 
pressure on the movement, as the Saudi forces are widely feared in much of the Bahraini society. The 
regime tore down the Pearl Statue that had come to symbolize the revolutionary movement and estab-
lished a highway that remains closed for Bahrainis to substitute the Pearl Roundabout. The strategy since 
then has been to de-energize revolutionaries by not killing activists (which would have provoked anger 
and a basis for further mobilization, not least at funerals), but instead slowly and silently suppressing the 
Shia community and those engaged in activism by injuring, imprisoning, torturing, and denying them 
their basic rights. 
An important dimension affecting the civil-military relations or protester-riot police relations in Bahrain 
is the employment of expats in the police and army. On the one hand, this poses a challenge for protesters, 
as it hinders communication and makes it more difficult to appeal to common values and thus have the 
security forces side with or at least not attack the protesters. On the other hand, this may be an important 
aspect of why the Bahraini revolution has not spiraled into a civil war, as the security forces are not seen 
as representing fellow Bahraini Sunnis, but merely the regime, and thus relations against other Bahraini 
Sunnis are not considered legitimate. 
The micro-sociological approach applied in this article suggests a new way of comprehending civil-military 
relations in their very concrete form: How do interactions between protesters and the security forces shape 
how a conflict develops? Also, it takes into account the emotional forces that shape if and how people are 
able to act rather than merely the rational calculations behind this. What is gained by zooming in on such 
micro-processes is not only a detailed narrative of the events, but also recognition of dynamics that would 
otherwise not come out in other types of analysis, for example how particular forms of repression make 
people gather in solidarity and outrage, energizing further counter-action, whereas other forms of repres-
sion involving torture, imprisonment, and injuring, but no visible, lethal violence, de-energize a protest 
movement. 
The micro-sociological approach can likewise shed light on how civil-military interactions shape other 
conflict developments and at least in part account for how conflicts take different pathways depending 
on which of the parties is able to dominate the situation and remain united. Elsewhere I have compared 
the micro-dynamics shaping the first period of the Bahraini uprising to the uprisings in Syria and Tunisia. 
In Syria, one could argue, the demonstrations were met with increasingly lethal force, which continued to 
enrage and energize further mobilization. When conflict lines were displaced, as in Bahrain, this split the 
movement as well as the regime, in particular the military, which prompted an escalatory process in which 
neither party was able to dominate the situation in military or emotional terms (Bramsen, 2019). In Tunisia, 
on the other hand, activists were able to overthrow the regime because they mobilized large and diverse 
parts of the population and were able to maintain unity and momentum, whereas the regime suffered from 
miscommunication and lack of internal trust (Bramsen, 2018). 
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